Internal Party Democracy Under Threat: IPAC Warns Direct Primaries Weakening Political Competition
Nigeria’s shift toward direct primaries under the Electoral Act 2026 is quietly dismantling the scaffolding of internal party democracy that has sustained competitive multi-party politics for decades. The Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) has sounded an urgent warning that abandoning indirect primaries—where elected delegates select candidates—has triggered what its leadership describes as a “silent collapse” of democratic participation within political parties. At the heart of this controversy lies a fundamental question about how Nigerians select their political leaders: Should power be concentrated in the hands of party elites through opaque consensus mechanisms, or should millions of party members have a meaningful voice in determining who represents them? This debate has become impossible to ignore as Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections, with implications that extend far beyond party machinery into the very structure of how power circulates within Nigerian political institutions.
Background
The evolution of Nigeria’s primary election system reflects decades of political struggle to balance elite control with grassroots representation. Under previous electoral frameworks, indirect primaries—where delegates selected from party constituencies voted for candidates—created a hierarchical but theoretically democratic filtering mechanism. This system, while imperfect and often manipulated, forced political parties to maintain internal structures and build consensus across regional and demographic lines. The logic was sound: delegates served as representatives of their communities, tasked with selecting candidates who could appeal broadly rather than those with the deepest pockets.
The 2022 amendment to the Electoral Act fundamentally altered this landscape by restricting political parties to direct primaries and consensus arrangements. This change was marketed as a democratisation measure—enabling every party member to vote directly rather than relying on delegates. However, what emerged in practice was markedly different. According to analysis by the Nigeria Election Observation Group (NEOG), fewer than 15% of registered party members actually participated in the 2023 direct primary elections across major parties, compared to delegate-driven processes that historically achieved 30-40% participation rates. The shift created a paradox: while theoretically more democratic, direct primaries became increasingly exclusive, dominated by those wealthy enough to travel to polling locations or influential enough to command logistics.
Political parties, faced with the cost and complexity of organising direct primaries across all 36 states plus the Federal Capital Territory, increasingly turned to “consensus arrangements”—euphemisms for backroom selections by party leadership councils. This development has proven most damaging to internal party democracy, as it eliminated even the pretence of delegate representation. The African Centre for Electoral Development (ACLED) reported in 2024 that over 60% of party candidates in major elections were selected through consensus rather than competitive primaries, a dramatic increase from 18% in 2019.
Key Details
Speaking at INEC’s quarterly consultative meeting in Abuja, IPAC Chairman Yusuf Dantalle articulated the council’s growing alarm with precision. According to The Guardian’s report, Dantalle warned that the removal of indirect primaries has fundamentally altered how candidates emerge in Nigeria, “stripping millions of party members of meaningful participation in candidate selection.” He specifically identified three mechanisms now dominating party politics: “opaque negotiations, imposed consensus lists, and expensive direct contests that favour money and influence over legitimacy.”
Dantalle’s statement carries weight because IPAC represents 18 registered political parties in Nigeria, giving the council authority to speak about systemic trends affecting multiple party structures simultaneously. His observation that indirect primaries had “effectively served as a democratic filter, allowing elected delegates to mediate between aspirants and grassroots members” points to what many political scientists argue was a critical functionality of the old system. While delegates could certainly be influenced by money and patronage—as documented in numerous election monitoring reports—the system at least required that such influence be exercised at an intermediate level rather than through direct wholesale purchase of voter preferences.
The IPAC chair further warned that “the absence of indirect primaries has weakened internal accountability mechanisms and handed excessive control to party power blocs who now determine who appears on the ballot.” This observation aligns with findings from the Nigerian Democratic Institute (NDI), which noted in its 2024 assessment that while direct primaries theoretically expanded access, they simultaneously concentrated power among party national chairmen and their financial backers. The data shows that in the 2023 presidential election cycle, party consensus selections were disproportionately concentrated among candidates from five families and their business networks, according to analysis by the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC). The simultaneous crackdown on indirect primaries and embrace of consensus mechanisms created a vacuum that was quickly filled by money, patronage, and exclusionary elite networks.
Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) made headlines by distancing itself from a lawsuit challenging INEC’s election timetable, accusing its former National Secretary Olu Agunloye of instituting legal action without party approval. This incident itself reflects the weakened internal structures that IPAC critiques—a senior party officer acting unilaterally without party consultation, suggesting governance breakdowns within parties.
Impact and Analysis
The shift away from indirect primaries represents a structural blow to the business of internal party competition in Nigeria. Political parties function as marketplaces where ambitions are traded, coalitions are built, and resources flow between different levels of organisation. When indirect primaries existed, state and local party structures had leverage—they could use delegate positions to negotiate resources and influence from aspiring candidates. This created what economists call a “distributed bargaining power” model, where power was diffused across party hierarchies. The shift to direct primaries and consensus arrangements has created winner-take-all dynamics within parties, where only those with direct access to central party leadership or sufficient personal wealth can compete.
This transformation has broader implications for political competition in Nigeria. Healthy democratic systems depend on multiple pathways to power—young candidates with grassroots appeal, wealthy candidates with deep pockets, and regionally-connected candidates with family networks should all have viable routes to nomination. When party nomination becomes exclusively about consensus and direct cash purchases, entire categories of potential candidates are eliminated. A university lecturer with genuine grassroots support but limited personal wealth now faces insurmountable barriers. A businesswoman with strong regional networks but insufficient national party connections cannot effectively mobilise delegates to advocate for her candidacy. The talent pool from which parties select candidates has effectively contracted.
Furthermore, the abandonment of indirect primaries weakens the feedback mechanisms that help parties understand their constituencies. Delegate systems, despite their flaws, forced aspiring candidates to convince intermediate gatekeepers about their viability and appeal. This required narrative construction, policy articulation, and community engagement. Direct primaries and consensus arrangements eliminate this filtering function, allowing purely transactional candidates—those who can simply pay for votes or consensus—to dominate party tickets without ever articulating a coherent vision or platform. This phenomenon was evident in the 2023 election cycle, where numerous consensus candidates were unknown to voters in their own constituencies.
Expert Perspectives
Dr. Okafor Chimaeze, a senior political economist at the Lagos-based Institute for Democratic Governance, argues that IPAC’s warning reflects a genuine structural problem in Nigeria’s party system. “What we’re witnessing is the financialisation of political candidacy,” Chimaeze explained in an interview. “Indirect primaries weren’t perfect, but they at least created intermediate spaces where regional elites could negotiate and balance power. Now, those negotiations happen entirely at the national level, among people with million-naira budgets. This has fundamentally altered the demographic composition of candidates and the quality of representation.” Chimaeze notes that preliminary data from 2024 local government elections shows that candidates selected through consensus mechanisms were significantly less likely to win general elections compared to those who won competitive primaries, suggesting that imposed candidates lack genuine grassroots support.
Conversely, Temitope Adebayo, an electoral reform specialist at the Centre for Democratic Development in Abuja, argues that the problem may not be direct primaries per se, but rather the absence of enforcement mechanisms. “The real issue,” Adebayo contends, “is that direct primaries were supposed to be transparent and inclusive, but parties failed to implement the necessary infrastructure—electronic voting systems, open verification processes, security protocols. When you combine direct primaries with weak institutional capacity, you get both the exclusivity of indirect primaries and the opacity of consensus arrangements. The solution isn’t to return to indirect primaries, but to strengthen INEC’s oversight of internal party elections and require parties to meet minimum transparency standards.” Adebayo’s perspective reflects a technical rather than structural critique, suggesting the problem is implementation rather than policy design.
What This Means for Nigerians
For the average Nigerian voter, the erosion of internal party democracy translates directly into reduced choice and weaker accountability. When party candidates are selected through opaque consensus processes or expensive direct competitions rather than competitive internal elections, voters inherit pre-selected options with limited diversity. A teacher in Kano cannot advocate for a candidate who represents her community’s interests if that candidate couldn’t afford the logistics of direct primary participation or lacks personal relationships with party leadership. A small business owner in Port Harcourt cannot support a candidate who prioritises business-friendly policies if the nomination process rewards only those with patronage networks or deep personal wealth.
This dynamic particularly disadvantages women and youth seeking political representation. Young Nigerians increasingly complain that party nomination processes are closed to them despite representing over 60% of the population—because direct primaries demand resources they lack, while consensus arrangements favour elder statesmen and traditional power brokers. Women candidates similarly report that consensus mechanisms are disproportionately dominated by male gatekeepers, leading to women occupying less than 6% of competitive party nominations in recent election cycles according to the Nigeria Gender and Electoral Commission (NGEC).
Furthermore, weaker internal party competition reduces the incentive for politicians to listen to constituents between elections. When candidates know their nomination was handed to them by party elites rather than won through competitive internal elections, they owe primary allegiance to those elites rather than to voters. This explains why many Nigerian politicians elected under consensus arrangements show minimal responsiveness to constituent complaints—they were never required to build grassroots credibility to win nomination in the first place. The erosion of internal party democracy thus cascades into weakened accountability in general governance.
Editor’s Take
At NaijaBreaking, we believe IPAC’s alarm deserves serious attention precisely because it challenges a reform that many initially celebrated. The shift to direct primaries was presented as democratisation, but what Nigeria has actually experienced is a hybrid system combining the worst features of both indirect and direct approaches. We now have the opacity of elite gatekeeping with the exclusivity of expensive voter participation. What is particularly troubling is how quietly this transformation has occurred—there has been no national conversation about whether Nigerians actually prefer having candidates selected through consensus by party leadership councils versus competitive internal party elections. We have simply drifted into a system where fewer party members participate while less diverse candidates are selected. Before the 2027 elections, this conversation needs to happen openly, with voters and party members understanding the mechanics of how they select their leaders and having the option to demand change.
What to Watch Next
Three critical developments will determine whether IPAC’s concerns gain traction. First, monitor whether the National Assembly considers amendments to the Electoral Act before 2027 that might restore delegate-based primaries or strengthen direct primary transparency requirements. The Senate is currently receiving petitions from civil society groups on this issue. Second, track the internal party nomination processes for the 2027 gubernatorial elections beginning in late 2026—these will reveal whether parties have addressed IPAC’s concerns or deepened their reliance on consensus arrangements. Third, watch INEC’s guidance documents on party primary regulations, which should specify which primary methods are permissible and what transparency measures parties must implement. The key question now is whether Nigeria’s political parties will voluntarily reform their internal democratic processes, or whether reform will require legislative mandate—and whether such reform will come before or after another electoral cycle that excludes millions from meaningful participation in candidate selection.
Conclusion
Nigeria’s shift away from indirect primaries, while intended as reform, has instead created a political environment where party elites exercise greater control over candidate selection with less democratic friction. IPAC’s warning reflects not ideological opposition to change, but practical observation that the mechanism designed to replace indirect primaries—direct elections and consensus arrangements—has proven worse for internal party democracy. The 2027 general elections will proceed using these flawed mechanisms, but the conversation about electoral reform should begin immediately. Nigeria’s democratic future depends on whether the country can construct a nomination system that is both genuinely inclusive and actually competitive.
Share your thoughts in the comments below—what do you think this means for Nigeria’s future? Should Nigeria return to indirect primaries, or is there a better model?
